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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

SUMMARY

WATKINS v. UNITED STATES ARMY: THE
NINTH CIRCUIT FORCES THE ARMY OUT
OF THE CLOSET
I. INTRODUCTION

In Watkins v. United States Army,! a sharply divided 11
member en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit equitably estopped
the Army from denying reenlistment to Sergeant Perry J. Watkins. 2 This was the third time in seven years that the case came
before the Ninth Circuit. 8 The Ninth Circuit withdrew both of
its previous opinions and reinstated an order that it had rever~sed in 1983. 4 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's first decision in
1. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (per
Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, C.J., Schroeder, J., Alarcon, J.,
Nelson, J., Canby, J., concurring, Norris, J., concurring in the judgment, Beezer, J., Hall,
J., dissenting, O'Scannlain, J., and Trott, J.).
2. Id. at 704-05.
3. See Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983) (equity powers
of the federal courts cannot be exercised to order military officials to violate their own
regulations absent a determination that those regulations violate the Constitution or the
military's statutory authority); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988) (Army's reenlistment regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against persons of homosexual orientation, a suspect class, without promoting a
legitimate compelling government interest).
4. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711. The majority noted that the law of the case doctrine
did not prevent it from reconsidering issues raised in the earlier panel decisions of the
case. See e.g. Shimman v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, 744
F.2d 1226, 1229 n.3 (6th Cir. 1984) (en bane) ("law of the case doctrine ... does not
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the case, hereinafter called Watkins I, a majority ruled that
Watkins' equitable estoppel claim was justiciable. 1I Reaching the
merits of the claim, the majority held that the Army had effectively waived its right to deny reenlistment to Watkins on
grounds that his reenlistment would violate an Army regulation
barring the reenlistment of gays and lesbians. s Contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's second decision in the case, hereinafter called
Watkins II, the majority concluded that it was unnecessary to
reach the difficult constitutional issue of whether to apply strict,
intermediate or rational level scrutiny to government classifications based on sexual orientation. 7 The Ninth Circuit's decision
illustrates that under extraordinary circumstances a federal
court can and will exercise its equity powers to order the military to violate its own regulations. s
II. FACTS
In 1967, at the age of 19, Perry J. Watkins was drafted and
admitted into the United States Army, despite the Army's longimpair the power of an en banc court to overrule any panel decision."), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1215 (1985); Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 436-37 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (law of the case doctrine cannot immunize panel decisions from review by the
court en banc), aff'd, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); cf. United States v. Mills, 810 F.2d 907, 909
(9th Cir. 1987) (law of the case is a discretionary doctrine), cert. denied, 180 S.Ct. 107
(1987).
5. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 706.
6. Id. at 711.
7. Id. at 705. However, two of the seven judges in the majority wrote separately and
urged that the court should have reached Watkins' constitutional claim. Judge Norris
wrote that he believed Watkins' equitable estoppel claim was barred by precedent, but
he concurred in the judgment because he also believed that Watkins had prevailed on his
equal protection claim. Id. at 711 (Norris, J., concurring in judgment). Judge Canby
wrote that the court should have reached Watkins' constitutional claim even though
Watkins had prevailed on his equitable estoppel claim. See id. at 731 (Canby, J.,
concurring).
The dissent, written by Judge Hall and joined by three other judges, sharply disagreed with the majority's refusal to reach Watkins' constitutional claim. See id. at 731
(Hall, J., dissenting). "The en banc majority shies away from this issue .... " Id. "The
majority's steadfast desire to avoid constitutional adjudication does not support its destruction of a valuable justiciability doctrine." Id. at 736. "The majority's desire to avoid
the difficult equal protection question presented in this case is no reason to dispense
with well-established case law." Id. at 737.
Thus, actually a six to five majority of the court (the four dissenting judges plus
Judges Norris and Canby) agreed that Watkins' constitutional claim should have been
addressed. However, Judge Norris was the only judge who wrote an opinion on Watkins'
constitutional claim and Judge Canby was the only judge who joined.
8. See infra notes 83 - 109 and accompanying text.
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standing "non-waivable" policy of excluding all gays and lesbians from service. 9 About one year later, the Army conducted a
criminal investigation into Watkins' sexual conduct, during
which Watkins signed an affidavit stating that he had been gay
from the age of 13 and that, since his enlistment, he had engaged in sodomy with two other servicemen. 1o The Army subsequently dropped the investigation because of insufficient evidence. l l In 1961, the Army accepted Watkins' application for a
second three-year term. 12
In 1972, the Army again investigated Watkins for allegedly
committing sodomy and, for the second time, terminated the investigation for insufficient evidence. 13 The Army honorably discharged Watkins in 1974 and immediately accepted his application for a six-year reenlistment. 14 In 1975, the Army convened a
board of four officers to determine whether Watkins should be
discharged because of his homosexual tendencies. 1G The Secretary of the Army adopted the board's unanimous recommendation to retain Watkins. 16
9. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 701. The Army's preinduction medical form required Watkins to indicate whether he had homosexual tendencies. Watkins answered in the affirmative. [d. Watkins served as a chaplain's assistant, personnel specialist and company
clerk during his initial three-year tour of duty in the United States and Korea. [d.
10. [d. Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes it a crime for a
serviceperson to engage "in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same
or opposite sex." 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976). This language has been held to outlaw both
heterosexual and homosexual oral and anal intercourse, even if it occurs in the privacy of
a bedroom, where both persons have meaningfully consented and neither has used force
or money to coerce the other. See United States v. Morgan, Jr., 8 C.M.A. 341 (1957)
(consensual as well as nonconsensual sodomy is included within 10 U.S.C.S. § 925);
United States v. Jones, 14 M.J. 1008 (CMR 1982) (10 U.S.C.S. § 925 is constitutional as
applied to private sodomy between consenting adults of different sex).
11. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 701-02.
12. [d. at 702. Watkins received an honorable discharge in 1970. [d. His reenlistment eligibility code was listed as "unknown." [d. Watkins requested clarification of his
reenlistment eligibility code in 1971. [d. The Army changed the code to category 1, "eligible for reentry on active duty." [d.
13. [d. The investigation followed the Army's denial of Watkins' application for a
security clearance. [d.
14. [d.
15. [d.
16. [d. Watkins' commanding officer and a sergeant testified that Watkins did "a

fantastic job" and that Watkins' well known homosexuality did not affect the company.
[d. The board recommended that the Army retain Watkins because "there is no evidence

suggesting that his behavior has had either a degrading effect upon unit performance,
morale or discipline, or upon his own job performance." Id.
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In November 1977, the Army granted Watkins a security
clearance. 17 Watkins worked without incident until he publicly
disclosed his sexual orientation in an interview on March 15,
1979. 18 This prompted another Army investigation. IS While the
investigation was pending, the Army accepted Watkins' application for a three-year reenlistment. 2o In July 1980, the Army revoked Watkins' security clearance. U
In August 1981, Watkins filed suit against the Army in Federal District Court.22 On October 5, 1982, the district court enjoined the Army from refusing to reenlist Watkins because of his
sexual orientation. 23 The court held that the Army was equitably
estopped from relying on its longstanding policy of disqualifying
17. [d. However, the Nuclear Surety Personnel Reliability Program initially rejected
Watkins' application for a position. [d. Watkins' commanding officer subsequently requested that Watkins be requalified for a position in the program, stating that Watkins
was highly trusted and respected among peers, superiors and subordinates. [d. Based on
the request of Watkins' commanding officer and an examining Army physician's conclusion that Watkins' sexual orientation did not cause him problems in his work, Watkins
was admitted into the program. [d.
18.
19.
20.
21.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. The Army based its decision on Watkins' March 1979 admission of homosex-

uality, medical records containing his 1968 affidavit stating that he had engaged in homosexual conduct, and his history of performing (with the permission of his commanding
officer) as a female impersonator in various revues. [d.
22. [d. at 703. Watkins' suit originally sought only to have his security clearance
reinstated. [d. at 703, n. 3. In 1981, the Army promulgated a new regulation which mandated the discharge of all gays and lesbians from service, regardless of merit. [d. at 702.
The new regulation also clarified the Army's longstanding policy of disqualifying all gays
and lesbians from reenlistment. See id. at 703 n. 5. See also AR 635-200, chpt. 15 (mandating discharge of all homosexuals, regardless of merit); AR 601-280, § 2-21(c) (disqualifying all homosexuals from reenlistment).
Pursuant to the new regulation, the Army convened discharge proceedings against
Watkins. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 702. Watkins amended his complaint to enjoin the Army
from discharging him on the basis of his sexual orientation. [d. at 703 n. 3. The Army
board rejected evidence that Watkins had engaged in homosexual conduct after 1968,
but recommended discharging Watkins anyway because "he has stated that he is a homosexual." [d. at 702-03. In May 1982, the Army Secretary adopted the board's recommendation. [d. Before the Army discharged Watkins, however, the district court ruled
that the Army's double jeopardy provision barred it from discharging Watkins on the
basis of his stating that he was homosexual and that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that he had engaged in homosexual conduct subsequent to the 1975
discharge proceedings. [d. at 703 n. 4.
The Army allowed Watkins to complete his current tour of duty, which expired in
October 1982. [d. The Army rejected Watkins' application for reenlistment, citing its
longstanding policy of disqualifying gays and lesbians from reenlistment. [d.
23. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 703.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss1/5

4

Karris: Administrative Law

1990]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

5

gays and lesbians from service to deny Watkins' application for
reenlistment. 24 The Army appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit.2G
In Watkins I, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district
court's injunction, reasoning that the equity powers of the federal courts could not be exercised to order military officials to
violate their own regulations, absent a determination that the
regulations violated the Federal Constitution or the military's
statutory authority.26 On remand, the district court held that
the Army's regulations did not violate the Constitution or the
Army's statutory authority.27 Watkins appealed. 28 In Watkins
II, a different Ninth Circuit panel held that the Army's reenlisment regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause because
they discriminate against gays and lesbians, a suspect class. 29
The Army petitioned for an en bane rehearing. 30 The full court
granted review to address the issues raised in Watkins I and
Watkins II.31
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

BACKGROUND

A plaintiff attempting to sue a federal agency or officer must
first demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction
(because the suit is authorized by a specific federal statute) and
that the suit is not barred by sovereign immunity.32 Even if sub24. Id. Accordingly, the Army reenlisted Watkins for a six-year term on November
1, 1982, on condition that the reenlistment would be voided if the district court's injunction were not upheld on appeal. Id. at 703.
While the Army's appeal of the district court injunction was pending, Watkins'
superiors rated his performance and professionalism, giving Watkins perfect scores in
every category and writing that Watkins' potential is "unlimited" and that Watkins
should be promoted "at the earliest opportunity." Id. at 703-04.
25. Id. at 704.
26. Id. (citing Watkins I, 721 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1983)).
27.Id.
28.Id.
29. Id. (citing Watkins II, 847 F.2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1988)).
30.Id.
31. Id. (citing Watkins II, 847 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988)).
32. See 14 Wright, Miller & Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3655
(1985). The Tucker Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Administrative Procedure
Act provide the major exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. For a general discussion of jurisdiction over actions against the United States, see §§ 3654 - 3660.
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ject matter jurisdiction exists, the concept of justiciability forces
federal courts to decline their jurisdiction to hear certain
claims. 33 Justiciability plays a crucial role in determining
whether a court will hear a particular claim against the military;
"[f]ederal courts restrict their review of military decision-making not because they lack jurisdictional power to hear military
disputes, but out of deference to the special function of the military in our constitutional structure and in the system of national
defense. "34
In Watkins, the Army did not dispute the court's subject
matter jurisdiction or assert sovereign immunity as a defense. 35
Instead, it focused its defense on the justiciability issue, arguing
that, under Mindes v. Seaman,36 the court must decline to hear
Watkins' equitable estoppel claim. 37 Watkins argued that
Mindes did not apply and that, under Wagner v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency,38 he was entitled to equitable estoppe1. 39 Watkins was the first case analyzing whether
Mindes bars all non constitutional equitable claims against the
33. ':Justiciability is an analytical approach that has been 'developed to identify appropriate occasions for judicial action, both as a matter of defining the limits of the
judicial power created by Article III of the Constitution, and as a matter of justifying
refusals to exercise the power even in cases within the reach of Article IlL' " Malamud v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 at 146 (1975)). "An all purpose definition of
justiciability has never been published because of the 'notorious difficulty' of defining the
concept." Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1085 n. 34 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1600 (1984). See generally 13, 13A Wright, Miller &
Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3529 - 3537 (1984).
34. Sebra v. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Khalsa v. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395-97 (9th Cir. 1985), judgment aff'd, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1985)). "[T]he doctrine of limited reviewability of certain military regulations and decisions is a matter of justiciability, analagous to the political questions doctrine." Khalsa v.
Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985), judgment aff'd, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1985).
35. See supra note 3. See also Watkins v. United States Army, 541 F.Supp. 249, 257
(1982) (voiding Army ruling discharging Watkins on grounds that it "was arbitrary, unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law"); Watkins v. United States
Army, 551 F.Supp. 212 (1982) (estopping Army from relying on regulation that bars
reenlistment of gays and lesbians as grounds for denying reenlistment to Watkins).
36. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971) (Air Force captain alleged that Air Force's decision
to transfer him from active to reserve duty violated his right to procedural due process).
37. See infra notes 40 - 65 and accompanying text.
38. 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988) (insureds sought review of federal insurance
agency's denial of insureds' claims for damage to their home caused by flood induced by
landslide) .
39. See infra notes 66 - 82 and accompanying text.
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military and, if not, whether Wagner governs some such claims.
1.

The Mindes Test

In 1950, the Supreme Court held in Feres v. United States 40
that the government has no Federal Tort Claims Act liability for
injuries to military service members arising in the course of military service. 41 The Court has not retreated from this position; in
fact, a series of cases actually expanded upon it.42 The Court has
recently stated that Feres bars tort claims against the military
because these are the "type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at
the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."43
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents,44 that a person may redress federal
agents' constitutional violations of his rights by filing an action
under federal constitutional law seeking money damages}1I Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivens and the majority in
40. 340 u.s. 135 (1950) (widow of soldier who was killed when a defective heating
plant caused his barracks to catch fire brought wrongful death action against Army).
41. [d.
42. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,162 (1963) (federal prisoner sued

under the Federal Torts Claim Act to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
during confinement in a federal prison). In distinguishing the Feres case and allowing a
federal prisoner to maintain an action against prison officials, the Court in Muniz stated
that "Feres seems to be best explained by the 'peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline ..
. .''') (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). The Court recently
expanded the scope of Feres to preclude tort actions by military service members who
were injured in the course of service by the action of a civilian government employee.
See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (widow of coast guard helicopter pilot
brought wrongful death action against United States alleging that civilian air traffic controller's negligence caused the helicopter crash that killed her husband).
43. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (mother of Army private
brought wrongful death action against Army alleging that it had negligently failed to
warn her son that the serviceman who kidnapped and murdered him had been previously
convicted of murder and manslaughter). Likewise, the Court in Johnson concluded that
the mere pendency of a suit against the government by a service member "could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt
military discipline in the broadest sense of the word." United States v. Johnson, 107
S.Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987).
44. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (plaintiff sued Federal Bureau of Narcotics for damages resulting from the warrantless entry and search of his apartment and his subsequent
arrest).
45. [d.
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Butz v. Economou,46 reasoned that injunctive or declaratory relief is useless in most instances of constitutional violations because the plaintiff has already been injured. 47 "'For people in
[those] shoes, it is damages or nothing.' "46 The Court in Butz
concluded that "[t]he extension of absolute immunity from
damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously
erode the protection provided by basic constitutional
guarantees. "49
Although the Supreme Court subsequently applied the
Feres rationale to bar Bivens-type damages claims against the
military,IIO federal courts have never granted military officials absolute immunity from claims seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief. III In 1971, the Fifth Circuit articulated the
Mindes test for determining whether the federal court could review a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against the military.1I2 According to the first prong of the Mindes test, the
plaintiff must establish that he has properly alleged that the
military's action either deprived him of a federal constitutional
right or violated a military statute or regulation and that he has
exhausted all available intraservice remedies. 1I3 Assuming the
claim survives this preliminary analysis, Mindes requires the
court to consider the nature and strength of the plaintiff's claim,
the potential injury to him if review is refused, the type and degree of anticipated interference with the military function if review is granted and the level of military expertise and discretion
involved.1I4
Except for 'the Third Circuit, which rejected the Mindes
test because "it intertwines the concept of justiciability with the
standards to be applied to the merits of the case,"1I1I all the cir46. 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (action for damages against Department of Agriculture
after it had unsuccessfully attempted to r.evoke or suspend the registration of plaintiff's
company).
47. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring); Butz, 438 U.S. at 504.
48. Butz, 438 U.S. at 505 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
49. Butz 438 U.S. at 505.
50. See infra notes 62 - 63 and accompanying text.
51. See Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
52. [d. at 198.
53. [d. at 201.
54. [d. at 201-02.
55. Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981) (servicewoman claimed that
Army regulation prohibiting the enlistment of a single parent with a dependent child
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cuits have adopted the Mindes test, at least in part. 56 The Ninth
Circuit first applied the Mindes test in 1978,57 but did not formally adopt it until 1981 when it decided Wallace v. Chappell. 58
In Chappell, five Navy enlisted men alleged that certain officers
discriminated against them on the basis of race in making duty
assignments and performance evaluations. 59 The Ninth Circuit
held that the Mindes test should be applied to ascertain the reviewability of constitutional claims against the military, but expressed "no view as to whether the Mindes test should govern
federal nonconstitutional claims."60 Applying the first prong of
constituted sex discrimination and violated her equal protection rights).
56. See e.g. Costner v. Oklahoma Army Nat'l Guard, 833 F.2d 905, 907 (10th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (member of state national guard claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his age); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir.
1987) (member of state national guard claimed that he had been discriminated against
on the basis of his race), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 402 (1988); Williams v. Wilson, 762 F.2d
357, 359 (4th Cir. 1985) (member of state national guard claimed that National Guard
had violated its own procedural regulations regarding selective retention); Ogden v.
United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1179 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1985) (Navy personnel claimed that
their first amendment rights had been violated); Penagaricano v. Llenza, 747 F.2d 55, 6061 (1st Cir. 1984) (member of Air National Guard claimed that his discharge violated
procedural due process); Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1982) (sergeant in
Air Force Reserve claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his
age), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); Ct. Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 468 (D.C.Cir.
1986) (former Army officer claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis
of her sex); Schultz v. Wellman, 717 F.2d 301, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1983) (member of National guard claimed that his dismissal violated § 1983); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d
1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1976) (former servicewoman claimed that Marine Corps.' policy mandating discharge for pregnancy violated her rights to equal protection and due process).
57. Schlanger v. United States, 586 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1978) (former Air Force enlistee challenged his removal from the Airman's Education and Commissioning Program
and his reassignment elsewhere), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979).
58. 661 F.2d 729, 733 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (Navy enlisted men brought race discrimination action against superior officers), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
59. Wallace, 661 F.2d at 730.
60. Id. at 733 n. 4. Dicta in most Ninth Circuit cases following Chappell, including
Watkins I, implies that an internal military decision is reviewable only when the plaintiff alleges a constitutional, statutory or regulatory violation. See Christoffersen v. Washington State Air National Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1988) (former national
guardsmen claimed that the Guard's decision not to retain them violated their first
amendment rights); Sandidge v. State of Washington, 813 F.2d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 1987)
(National Guard officer sought revision of job performance evaluation that allegedly violated his constitutional right to free association); Sebra V. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135, 1141
(9th Cir. 1986) (member of California National Guard claimed that his transfer violated
his due process and first amendment rights and that it also violated § 1983 and the
National Guard's own regulations); Khalsa V. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1985) (member of Sikh religion claimed that Army appearance regulations violated his
first amendment rights) reaff'd 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Gonzalez V. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 929 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (serviceman claimed that
Army had subjected him to race discrimination) ("[wle limited our adoption of the
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the Mindes test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
had alleged a Bivens-type claim to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations and remanded
the case to the district court for consideration of the second
prong of Mindes. 61
Without overruling Mindes, the Supreme Court reversed,62
on the grounds that Feres precludes enlisted military personnel
from maintaining any kind of damages claim against military officials that is not authorized by a specific statute, even if the
claim is based on an alleged constitutional violation. 63 Since
Chappell, circuit courts have applied the Mindes test to the two
types of claims that Chappell does not expressly foreclose: (1)
claims seeking strictly injunctive or declaratory relief against
military officials,6. and (2) damages claims against military officials based upon an explicit statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
§ 1985(3).611
Mindes analysis to 'cases in which the plaintiff has alleged [a violation of] a 'recognized'
constitutional right' ").
61. Wallace, 661 F.2d at 737-38.
62. The Court in Chappell noted that service members are not precluded from obtaining any relief whatsoever for constitutional violations, citing to three cases which
involved injunctive or declaratory relief. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). The
Court subsequently acknowledged that these citations "referred to redress designed to
halt or prevent the constitutional violation rather than the award of money damages."
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (member of Army brought suit under
Federal Torts Claim Act after Army secretly administered four doses of LSD to him
thereby causing severe personality changes that led to his discharge and the dissolution
of his marriage).
63. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). In fact, the Court noted that "[ilt is
clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline." [d.
at 301.
64. See Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1985) (Chappell does
not preclude an equitable remedy).
65. See Christoffersen v. Washington State Air Nat'l Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1441
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Chappell's rationale leaves the field open for Congress to
enact legislation authorizing servicemen's constitutional damages claims against their
superiors, but declining to decide whether Chappell bars any or all § 1983 claims for
alleged civil rights violations by military personnel). See also Mollnow v. Carlton, 716
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that Chappell merely rejected an implied damages remedy but, nonetheless, holding that plaintiff's expressly authorized § 1985(a) remedy was
properly dismissed because such liability would conflict with Chappell's underlying rationale), cert. denied. 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). See also Miller v. Newbauer. 862 F.2d 771,
775 (9th Cir. 1988) (leaving open the question of whether Chappell is inconsistent with a
damages suit pursuant to § 1985(3».
Other circuits have concluded that Chappell's reasoning is inconsistent with a dam-
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2. The Wagner Test

In United States v. Lazy FC Ranch,66 the Ninth Circuit
recognized that "[n]o fewer than eight circuits ... have stated
that there are some circumstances in which the Government will
be estopped . . .", and that estoppel should be applied against
the government "where justice and fair play require it."67 In Lavin v. Marsh,68 three years after it first applied the Mindes
test,69 the Ninth Circuit resolved an estoppel claim against the
Secretary of the Army according to principles governing estoppel
against the government. 70 Similarly, in Jablon v. United
States,71 the Ninth Circuit analyzed an estoppel claim against
the Air Force according to principles governing estoppel against
the government. 72 Dicta in Helm v. State of California,73 sumages action under § 1983 against state National Guard officials. See Jorden v. National
Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 108 (3d. Cir. 1986) (former National Guard member claimed
that his various supervisors had engaged in a conspiracy to harass him and to discharge
him on the basis of race and in retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 66 (1987); Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 366-67 (8th Cir.
1984) (black national guardsman's mother sued United States, the guardsman's superior
officers and the participants in a mock lynching incident involving her son), cert. denied,
473 U.S. 904 (1985); Martelon v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1984) (National Guard member sought relief from his termination as a technician), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1135 (1985).
66. 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973) (United States sued agriculture partnership to recover certain money paid to it under soil bank program).
67. [d. at 988-89. Later, in Saulque, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that the government may be estopped only when it is acting in its proprietary capacity and not when
it is acting in its sovereign capacity. Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 978 (9th Cir.
1981) (Paiute Indian challenged Bureau of Indian Affairs' denial of his application for
Indian allotment of land). That dicta was rejected, however, in Johnson v. Williford, 682
F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (prisoner, who was erroneously paroled, was entitled to equitably estop the government from revoking his release). In Johnson, the court held that the
government could be estopped even when it is acting in its sovereign capacity if the
effects would not unduly damage the public interest. [d. at 871 n.1 (emphasis added).
68. 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981) (lieutenant colonel sued for injunctive relief to
prevent mandatory removal from active service because of an age-based statutory yearsof-service limitation).
69. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
70. Lavin, 644 F.2d at 1383-84. The court stated: U[wJhile the Army's acts which led
to Lavin's mistaken belief may be labeled negligent, we do not find in the facts of this
case the kind of affirmative misconduct which would justify the application of equitable
estoppel." [d. at 1383.
71. 657 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1981) (physician, who sold his medical practice and
house in reliance on recruiter's promise that incentive pay for enlisting was payable upon
physician's giving oath of office and not upon entry on active duty, was not entitled to
equitably estop Army from revoking his active duty orders).
72. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not rely on principles regarding
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marily analyzed an equitable estoppel claim against the Army.
In Helm, the Ninth Circuit held that an age discrimination
claim against the Army was not justiciable even though it satisfied the -first prong of the Mindes test because "the special policy considerations involved in judicial review of military decisionmaking" favored finding Helm's claims nonreviewable. 74 It
also held that Helm's equitable estoppel claim could not be
raised for the first time on appeaPII In dicta, it stated that "even
had the issue been presented below," it would have been precluded by Lavin v. Marsh. 7s Thus, since its formal adoption of
the Mindes test in 1981, Watkins is the first case that required
the Ninth Circuit to analyze an equitable estoppel claim against
the military.
The United States Supreme Court has reversed several
Ninth Circuit decisions invoking equitable estoppel against the
government. 77 In Heckler v. Community Health Services of
Crawford County, Inc.,78 however, the Court declined to hold
that "there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring
that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel
might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in
some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in
their dealings with the Government."79 Rather, the majority
held that "the Government may not be estopped on the same
terms as any other litigant" because "[w]hen the Government is
unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has
equitable estoppel against the government because he was relying on a promissory estop·
pel theory rather than an equitable estoppel theory. [d. at 1067·70.
73. 722 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1983) (retired member of Army reserves sued for equitable relief from alleged age discrimination that resulted in his not being granted a promotion to grade of lieutenant colonel).
74. [d. at 510.
75. [d.
76. [d.
77. See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1982) (per curiam) (INS delay in

processing alien's spouse application for residency not grounds for invoking equitable
estoppel against the INS); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5,94 (1973) (per curiam) (INS could not
be equitably estopped from denying citizenship to Filipino war veteran); Montana v.
Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961) (government could not be equitably estopped from
denying citizenship to the child of a United States citizen born abroad even though the
child's mother relied on the advice of a United States government official who incorrectly
told her that she could return to the United States to deliver her baby).
78. 467 U.S. 51 (1984) (government sought to recover overpayments it had made to
provider of home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries).
79. [d. at 60-61 (emphasis in original).
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given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole
in obedience to the rule of law is undermined."so
In Wagner u. Director, Federal Emergency Management
Agency,S1 the Ninth Circuit clarified its approach to cases where
the plaintiff seeks to invoke equitable estoppel against the government. The court held that "[a] party seeking to raise estoppel
against the goverment must establish 'affirmative misconduct
going beyond mere negligence'; even then, 'estoppel will only apply where the government's wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and the public's interest will not suffer undue damage by
imposition of the liability.' "S2

B.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

1. Reviewability of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim

Noting that it would be "fruitless" for Watkins to pursue
further intraservice remedies,s3 the majority opinion began by
determining that Watkins had exhausted all "effective" intraservice remedies. S. The majority then addressed the issue of
whether Mindes bars all nonconstitutional claims against the
military.8Ci
The majority reasoned that if the Ninth Circuit extended
the application of Mindes to bar non constitutional claims such
as equitable estoppel, federal courts would be forced to decide
cases against the military on the broadest possible (constitutional) grounds rather than on the narrowest (nonconstitutional)
grounds. 88 Noting that "[t]he estoppel doctrine, like the Mindes
test, addresses the concerns of comity, prudence and deference
80. [d. at 60.
81. 847 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. [d. at 519 (quoting Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985)).
83. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 705. The Army's position was that Watkins' admitted homosexuality is a non-waivable disqualification for reenlistment. [d. The majority opinion,
written by Judge Pregerson, did not cite any authority or provide any explanation for
beginning the analysis in this manner. [d.
84. [d. (citing Southeast Alaska Conservation Counil, Inc. v. Watson, 697 F.2d 1305,
1309 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, [or] where pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture .... ")).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 706.
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[to the military],"87 the majority determined that "where estoppel obtains, there is simply no need to apply the reviewability
factors of the Mindes test."88 The majority concluded that "the
Mindes doctrine should not be extended to bar equitable estoppel against the military."89
2. Merits of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim

a. Affirmative Misconduct
The majority then proceeded to analyze Watkins' equitable
estoppel claim according to Wagner, which requires that a plaintiff attempting to invoke equitable estoppel against the government must establish that the government engaged in affirmative
misconduct. 90 Affirmative misconduct requires an affirmative
misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a material fact
by a government agent9} acting within the scope of his employment. 92 The majority ruled that the Army committed affirmative
misconduct by representing, throughout Watkins' 14 year military career, that Watkins was qualified for reenlistment93 The
majority noted that the Army's conduct in this case was "readily
distinguishable" from the Army's conduct in Lavin. 94
The majority also summarily rejected the Army's argument
87.
88.
89.
90.

[d.
[d.
[d.
See supra notes 81 - 82 and accompanying text.
91. See Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.

Ruby Co, 588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1978) (government brought action to quiet title
to "omitted lands" which lay between meander lines established by two different government surveys), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064,
1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. The government is not bound by the unauthorized acts of its agents. See Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917». See also Federal Crop Insurance Co. v. Merrill, 332
U.S. 380 (1947) (wheat grower whose application for insurance on his wheat crop had
been erroneously accepted by federal crop insurance agency sued to recover for loss on
his reseeded acreage).
93. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707. The majority also cited the district court's finding
that the Army had "plainly acted affirmatively in [violation of its regulations by) admitting, reclassifying, reenlisting, retaining, and promoting Watkins." [d. at 708.
94. [d. In Lavin, the Ninth Circuit refused to estop the Army from denying an
Army Reserve officer's entitlement to pension benefits because the Army's conduct "did
not amount to a 'pervasive pattern of false promises' for which the government could be
estopped." [d. (quoting Lavin, 664 F.2d at 1383).
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that the alleged misconduct in question was performed by the
unauthorized acts of its agents. 911 The Army Secretary had not
exceeded his authority each of the three times that he decided
to reenlist Watkins. 98
b. Balancing the Hardships
According to Wagner, a plaintiff attempting to invoke equitable estoppel against the government must also establish that
the balance of hardships tips in his favor. 97 The majority quoted
the district court's analysis of the balance of interests in Watkins' case:
The injury to plaintiff from having relied on the
Army's approval of his military career - and being denied it now - is the loss of his career. The
harm to the public interest if reenlistment is not
prevented is nonexistent. Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is an excellent soldier. His contribution to this Nation's security is of obvious benefit to the public. Furthermore, when the
government deals "carefully, honestly and fairly
with its citizens," the public interest is likewise
benefited. 98

The majority concluded the balance of hardships tipped in Watkins' favor because the possibility of damage to the public interest was still nonexistent. 99
95. [d.
96. [d. The Army had previously argued that reenlistment was exclusively the function of the Army Secretary. [d.
The majority also noted that an agent of the Army had "erased" the handwritten
July 29, 1981 entry on Watkin's Reenlistment Data Card and had "forged" a new entry
indicating that Watkins was ineligible for reenlistment due to his homsexuality. [d. at
708 n.15. The erased entry, besides being legible, was also corroborated by an unrebutted
affidavit from an Army sergeant. [d. The court deemed this circumstantial evidence of
the Army's consciousness of misconduct and an attempt to conceal that misconduct from
exposure. [d. The court did not indicate whether this evidence supported its conclusion
that the Army had engaged in affirmative misconduct. [d.
97. See Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1979).
See also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); Gestuvo v. District Director of
INS, 337 F.Supp. 1093, 1102 (C.D.Cal. 1971) (estopping the INS from refusing to revalidate approval of an immigrant's third preference classification).
98. [d. (citing Watkins, 551 F.Supp. 212, 223 (W.D.Wash. 1982) (citation omitted)).
99. [d. The court noted that the Army's most recent written evaluation of Watkins,
completed during the course of this legal action, contained nothing but the highest
praise, describing Watkins' duty performance as "outstanding in every regard" and his
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c. Traditional Elements of Estoppel
Finally, according to Wagner, a plaintiff attempting to invoke equitable estoppel against the government must also prove
each of the traditional elements of equitable estoppel. According
to United States v. Wharton,t°o traditional estoppel doctrine required Watkins to demonstrate that 1) the Army knew of its
policy mandating disqualification of all homosexuals from reenlistment; 2) the Army intended Watkins to rely on its waiver of
the policy; 3) Watkins was ignorant of the policy; and 4) Watkins was injured by his reliance on the Army's conduct. lol
The majority observed that the Army had been aware of
Watkins' homosexuality throughout his military career l02 and
concluded that the Army's argument that Deputy Chief of Staff
for PersonneP03 was unaware of the contents of Watkins' personnel file was "patently absurd."lo" The majority found that
the Army had intended that Watkins rely on its acceptances of
his reenlistment applications and that Watkins reasonably believed that the Army had intended to reenlist him. The majority
cited the district court findings that "[t]aken together, over a
career spanning more than 14 years, those acts amounted to a
policy of ignoring this service-member's homosexuality" and
that "[a]s a matter of law, the court concludes that the second
element of plaintiff's estoppel claim has been satisfied."loli The
potential as "unlimited." [d. Furthermore, an Army review board had determined in
1975 that "there was no evidence suggesting that [Watkins') behavior has had either a
degrading effect upon unit performance, morale or discipline, or upon his own job performance." [d.
100. 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (United States brought action for ejectment of
defendants from 40 acre parcel of government land).
101. [d. at 412. "(I) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must
intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the
estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the
true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury." [d. (quoting
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970».
102. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 710. "For the Army to acknowledge that it is aware of
plaintiff's homosexuality when it comes to conducting criminal investigations, holding
discharge proceedings, and revoking security clearances, but maintain that it is ignorant
when four enlistments are at issue, suggests bad faith." [d. (quoting Watkins, 551
F.Supp. at 220).
103. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is primarily responsible for Army
reenlistment. [d.
104. [d. (quoting Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 200).
105. [d. (quoting Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 222). For further support, the majority
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majority found that the Army's repeated waiver of its disqualification policy made it "impossible" for the court to charge Watkins with the knowledge that the disqualfication was, in fact,
nonwaivable. l06 Finally, the majority observed that Watkins relied on the Army's repeated waiver of its theoretically nonwaivable policy to his detriment. l07
The majority agreed with the district court's "thorough
analysis of this question" and its conclusion that Watkins had
sustained his burden of proving all of the traditional elements of
estoppeP08 Accordingly, the majority held that "[t]his is a case
where equity cries out and demands that the Army be estopped
from refusing to reenlist Watkins on the basis of his
homosexuality. "l09
likened Watkins' claim to that of the prisoner in the Johnson case. Id. In Johnson, after
eight adminstrative reviews, a prisoner was erroneously released on parole. Johnson v.
Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982). The mistake was not discovered for 15
months. Id. The court held that, as a matter of law, the prisoner had a right to believe
that he would remain on parole during good behavior. Id.
106. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 710. Again, the majority likened Watkins' claim to that of
the prisoner in the Johnson case. Id. In Johnson, the court held that, given the government's continuing active misadvice regarding his eligibility for parole, the prisoner could
not be charged with even constructive knowledge of the proper meaning of a parole statute. Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982).
107. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 710-711 (citing Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 223). The majority stated that Watkins had:
developed skills necessary for military employment and refrained from developing skills suitable for civilian jobs. He
worked more than 14 years toward a retirement benefit that
he could have sought elsewhere. Had the Army refused plaintiff reenlistment in the past, plaintiff would not have lost the
opportunity for civilian employment that would have brought
him to a point of equivalent achievement.
Id.
108. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 709.
109. Id. at 711. Only part IV of the dissent expressed the view that Watkins' equitable estoppel claim should fail on its merits. See id. at 737 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge
Trott was the only judge who joined that part of the dissent. See id. at 739. The other
judges who believed that Watkins should not prevail on his equitable estoppel claim did
so on the ground that the estoppel claim was not reviewable. See id. at 711 (Norris, J.,
concurring). Judge Beezer concurred in parts I, II, III and the first paragraph of part V
of the dissenting opinion. Chief Judge Goodwin concurred in parts I and III of the dissent. See id. at 739.
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CONCURRING OPINIONS

1. Judge Norris' Concurring Opinion

Judge Norris agreed with the majority's decision that the
Army must reconsider Watkins' reenlistment application without regard to his homosexuality.llo However, Judge Norris disapproved of the majority's decision to review Watkins' equitable
estoppel claim. l l l Judge Norris noted that the Supreme Court
"has declined to approve the invocation of equitable estoppel
against the government in cases where the facts are no less sympathetic than the facts in Sgt. Watkins' case."1l2 Judge Norris
also noted that, in the Heckler case, the Supreme Court expressed uncertainty as to whether equitable estoppel can ever be
invoked against the goverment. llS Judge Norris concluded that
Watkins' only justiciable non constitutional claim was a meritless
claim that the Army's discharge and reenlistment regulations violate the Administrative Procedure Act. ll "
Judge Norris also disapproved of the majority's refusal to
analyze the merits of Watkins' claim that the Army's discharge
and reenlistment regulations denied him (and other persons of
homosexual orientation) equal protection. 1lII Judge Norris reiterated the painstaking analysis of the majority opinion in Watkins
II, which had concluded that the Army's reenlistment regulation
violates the equal protection clause by discriminating against
persons of homosexual orientation, a suspect class, without promoting a legitimate compelling government interest. 1l6
Judge Norris found that the Army's discharge and reenlistment regulations discriminate against persons of homosexual
orientation.l17 Judge Norris then determined that the Ninth Cir110. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711 (Norris, J., concurring in judgment).
111. [d. "I agree with the dissent that the judgment cannot rest on the doctrine of
equitable estoppel." [d.
112. [d. (citing INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414
U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961)).
113. [d.
114. [d. at 712. This claim lacked merit because Watkins had not alleged that the

regulations were arbitrary or capricious on their face. [d. (emphasis added). Instead,
Watkins had claimed only that the regulations were arbitrary as applied to him. [d.
115. [d. at 711.
116. Compare id. at 712-31 with Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1330-53.
117. [d. at 712-16. Judge Norris found that "[tlhe regulations make any act or state-
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cuit had never issued a ruling on whether persons of homosexual
orientation constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause. 118 Judge Norris concluded that gays and lesbians constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes. ll9 Finally,
Judge Norris urged that the Army's reenlistment regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are not necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.12o
ment that might conceivably indicate a homosexual orientation evidence of homosexuality; that evidence is is turn weighed against any evidence of a heterosexual orientation."
[d. at 716.
118. [d. at 716-24. Judge Norris distinguished this issue from the issue decided by
the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (states may criminalize
consensual homosexual sodomy because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not give gays and lesbians a fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
[d. at 716-20. He also distinguished this issue from the issues decided by the Ninth Circuit in several other cases. [d. at 720-23. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1980) (Navy regulations providing for the discharge of personnel who engaged in homosexual acts do not violate any substantive due process rights), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1980) (Army's policy
of prosecuting cases involving homosexual sodomy while refusing to prosecute cases involving heterosexual sodomy did not unconstitutionally burden the exercise of an important substantive right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Army's policy bore a substantial relationship to an important government
interest), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327 (9th Cir. 1979) (gays and lesbians do not have a right of action against private parties who conspire to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws because the courts have not yet designated them a suspect or quasi-suspect class).
Finally, Judge Norris explained why the Ninth Circuit should not summarily dismiss the
issue on the ground that it would be anomalous to declare that state classifications based
on sexual orientation deserve strict scrutiny when states are permitted to criminalize
homosexual conduct. [d. at 723-24. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C.Cir. 1987)
(FBI's policy of discriminating against practicing homosexuals in its hiring decisions
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
119. [d. at 724-28. Judge Norris noted that lesbians and gays have suffered a history
of purposeful discrimination, that one's sexual orientation is irrelevant to the quality of
one's contribution to society, that one's sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic
because it is so central to one's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to
penalize a person for refusing to change that characteristic and that lesbians and gays
lack the political power necessary to obtain redress from the political branches of government. [d.
120. [d. at 728-31. Even granting special deference to the Army policy, Judge Norris
found that Palmore foreclosed the Army from justifying its refusal to reenlist homosexuals on grounds that the presence of homosexuals would lead to tensions between soldiers,
and to recruitment problems because many other members of the armed forces despise
homosexuality. [d. at 728 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state could not
grant custody of a white child to her father on ground that the child would likely suffer
social stigmatization if she lived with her mother because her mother had remarried to a
black man». Further, he found that Loving foreclosed the Army from arguing that its
regulations are grounded in legitimate moral norms. [d. at 729-30 (citing Loving v.
Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state could not outlaw marriages between whites and blacks
even if it sincerely believed that miscegenation - the mixing of racial blood lines - was
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2. Judge Canby's Concurring Opinion

Judge Canby concurred wholeheartedly in the majority
opinion.l2l He wrote separately, however, because he believed
that the majority should have reached Watkins' equal protection
claim even though its ruling on Watkins' equitable estoppel
claim may have disposed of the case. 122
D.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

The dissenting opinion shared "the majority's admiration of
Watkins' fine service to his country."123 The dissent, however,
concluded that the majority had failed to heed "well-established
case law which counsels against unnecessary judicial oversight of
and intrusion into military matters."12. The dissent disagreed
with all of the majority's reasons for refusing to apply Mindes.
The dissent urged that Watkins' equitable estoppel claim failed
to satisfy the first prong of the Mindes test in that it did not
raise a federal constitutional, statutory or regulatory matter. m
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's application of the
evil) ).
Judge Norris also discounted the Army's argument that military discipline might be
undermined if emotional relationships developed between homosexuals of different military rank because the regulation at issue was poorly tailored to advance that interest.
The regulation was grossly underinclusive in that did not address the problem of emotional attachments between male and female personnel. It was also grossly overinclusive
in that it disqualified all homosexuals whether or not they have developed any emotional
or sexual relationships with other soldiers. [d. at 730.
Finally, Judge Norris also rejected the Army's argument that its disqualification of
all homosexuals is necessary to achieve its compelling interest in excluding persons who
may be susceptible to blackmail. He found that the Army's regulations actually increase
the risk of blackmail because they discourage servicemembers from declaring their homosexuality. Judge Norris argued that the Army would only achieve this compelling interest if it adopted a regulation banning only those gays who had lied about or failed to
admit their sexual orientation. Moreover, Judge Norris argued that treating homosexuality as a nonwaivable disqualification from military service is not necessary to achieve this
compelling interest for the same reasons that other serious potential sources of blackmail, such as drug abuse and the commission of other serious military offenses, are
treated as waivable disqualifications. [d. at 731.
121. [d. (Canby, J., concurring).
122. [d. "Because we are en bane, and the constitutional issue is a recurring one, I
think I may appropriately reach it even though equitable estoppel may dispose of the
case." [d.
123. [d. at 731 (Hall, J., dissenting).
124. [d. at 739.
125. [d. at 732-33.
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Wagner test, asserting that Watkins had not satisfied his burden
of showing that the Army had engaged in affirmative misconduct
or that the balance of hardships tipped in his favor. 126 Furthermore, the dissent also disagreed with the majority's analysis of
the merits of Watkins' equitable estoppel claim, finding that
Watkins failed to establish the reasonableness of his reliance on
the Army's conduct. 127
1.

Reviewability of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim

The dissent began by urging that Feres and its progeny establish a "military discipline rationale" which emphasizes that
"all suits by active military personnel against the government
they serve have the potential to undermine [military effectiveness]."128 The dissent noted that in Chappell the Supreme
Court "relied upon Feres' military discipline rationale to conclude that enlisted military personnel cannot maintain a Bivens
suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations" and established that Congress has plenary
control over remedies against the military establishment. 129 The
dissent also noted that Mindes "itself arose solely in the context
of a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in connection
with plaintiff's forced separation from active duty."13o Reading
Feres, Mindes and Chappell together, the dissent urged that although suits for injunctive relief are inherently less intrusive
than suits for damages, "not all injunctive suits are equally welltaken."13l In analyzing the justiciability of a suit for injunctive
relief against the military, the dissent argued that the military
discipline rationale requires federal courts to balance the military establishment's need for protection from judicial intrusion
against the importance of the plaintiff's rights at stake. 132 Noting that only the vindication of federal interests outweighs the
qualified immunity given to federal executive officials,133 permits
126.
127.
128.
ing text.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

ld. 737-38.
ld. at 739.
ld. at 733 (emphasis in original). See also supra notes 40 - 43 and accompanyld. See also supra notes 59 - 65 and accompanying text.
ld. at 735. See also supra notes 50 - 54 and accompanying text.
ld.
ld.
See supra notes 44 - 49 and accompanying text.
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federal courts to grant equitable relief in nondiversity suits,134
and permits federal courts to review claims against state officers,m the dissent analogized that only the possible vindication
of federal interests should permit federal courts to review claims
for equitable relief against the military.lsB The dissent concluded
that Mindes governs the reviewability of all claims against the
military not directly precluded by the Supreme Court's Chappell decision because it "insures that judicial intrusions into military matters are limited to the vindication of federal
interests. "137
The dissent urged that the majority failed "to marshal any
case law in support of its holding that a common law estoppel
claim is justiciable against the military."138 The dissent found
that the majority interpreted the Chappell case completely out
of context by quoting Chappell as expressing no view as to
whether the Mindes test should govern federal nonconstitutional
claims. ISS The dissent urged that the majority had dispensed
134. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 735 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 400 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring».
135. The dissent noted that the Supreme Court declined to erect the Eleventh
Amendment as a complete bar to federal court jurisdiction of claims alleging unconstitutional conduct by a state actor. [d. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908». See also
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (the Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights); Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) ("Young's applicability has been tailored. to conform as precisely as possible to those specific situations in which it is 'necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights' and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme
authority of the United States''') (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105).
136. [d. at 735-36.
137. [d. at 736. According to the dissent, the majority's conclusion that Wagner sufficiently "addresses the concerns of comity, prudence and deference [to the military]"
and its "prediction that the United States military generally will be successful in estoppel suits does not carry the day." [d. at 736. The dissent noted that "[I]itigation is inherently disruptive, and entails the risk of 'erroneous judicial conclusions (which would becloud military decision-making),' " [d. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683
(1987». As the Supreme Court aptly noted in Stanley and Johnson, the mere pendency
of a lawsuit against the government has an adverse impact on military discipline in the
broadest sense of the word. [d. Moreover, "[I]itigation has certain crucial costs, [which]
include the expenses of litigation, [and] the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues." [d. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982».
138. [d.
139. [d. at 736-37 (citing Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 733 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983». The court in Chappell clearly indicated

that "the [plaintiff's] allegations must amount to more than a traditional state law
claim" to avoid the adverse impact that unnecessary judicial review of military matters
would have on military discipline. [d. at 736-37 (citing Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729,
733 n. 4,734 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983». "[A]II our cases
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with "well-established case law" in its desire to avoid the difficult equal protection question presented in this case. l4O
2. Merits of Watkins' Equitable Estoppel Claim
a. Affirmative Misconduct
The dissent urged that the majority had failed "to give genuine substance to [the] requirement that the Army's conduct
amounted to affirmative misconduct."l41 The dissent argued that
the Army's prior practice of excusing Watkins' homosexuality,
despite regulations precluding his reenlistment, created, at most,
an inference that the Army would overlook the regulation as to a
particular enlistment period. HZ
b. Balance of Hardships
The dissent urged that the majority attempted to finesse
the issue of whether "the public's interest will not suffer undue
damage by imposition of the liability"l43 by baldly stating that
the "harm to the public interest if reenlistment is not prevented
following Chappell" lend further support to this interpretation of Chappell, in that they
all "have insisted that the plaintiff's claims allege a federal constitutional, statutory, or
regulatory violation." Id. at 736.
140. Id. at 737. The dissent urged that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions does not, as the majority suggested, compel or persuade the court to
refrain from applying the Mindes test to Watkins' equitable estoppel claim even though
that would result in having to address the merits of his constitutional claim; the Supreme Court has held that such policy considerations "cannot override the constitutional
limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary." See Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121-23 (1984).
141. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 738. Although there is not a clear definition of "affirmative misconduct," the Supreme Court's reversals of several Ninth Circuit decisions invoking equitable estoppel against the government and the Supreme Court's rationale for
imposing the additional requirement illustrate that affirmative misconduct occurs only in
the most extraordinary circumstances. Id.
142. Id. "Such apparent acquiescence or ambivalence does not meet the threshhold
level of misfeasance needed to trigger equitable estoppel against the military" Id. The
Lauin case demonstrated that "even ... a direct misrepresentation can fail to constitute
affirmative misconduct." Id. (citing Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981». In
Lauin, Army Reserve Recruiters had induced the plaintiff into joining the Army Reserve
by representing that he could earn pension benefits after a specified number of years. Id.
The Army's years of service regulation mandated the plaintiff's removal before he could
earn the pension benefits that he had been promised. Id. The court did not estop the
Army from enforcing its years of service regulation. Id.
143. Id. at 739 (quoting Wagner v. Director, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 847 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1988».
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is nonexistent ... [because] [p]laintiff has demonstrated that he
is an excellent soldier."!" The dissent stressed that the majority
simply has no authority to substitute its own assessment of Watkins' impact on military matters for the Army's assessment that
having homosexual soldiers, even good ones like Watkins, interferes with its mission. 14ll Furthermore, the dissent asserted that
the majority greatly minimized the probable damage to the public interest by failing to consider the ramifications of its holding
if other homosexuals besides Watkins invoked equitable estoppel against the Army.l46
c. Traditional Elements of Estoppel
Finally, the dissent urged that Watkins did not prove that
he acted reasonably in believing that the Army had intended to
excuse his homosexuality, despite regulations precluding his
reenlistment. 147 The dissent concluded that Watkins simply was
not justified in assuming that the Army's decision to accept a
particular application for reenlistment would ensure such acceptance for all time. 148
IV. CONCLUSION
The panel of judges in Watkins addressed whether common
law equitable estoppel claims against the military are justiciable
and whether the military may be equitably estopped on the
same principles as any other federal agency. These issues had
never before been discussed at length by the Ninth Circuit or
any other federal court, including the Fifth Circuit when it articulated the Mindes test. l49 Any statements in Wallace and its
144. Id.
145. Id. at 739.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The dissent cited the Lavin case for the proposition that Watkins is
charged with the knowledge that executive officials have the prerogative of implementing
new programs and policies. so long as they do not run afoul of statutory or constitutional
provisions. Id.
149. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The dissent's argument that Mindes
itself arose in the context of a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in connection
with plaintiff's forced separation from active duty is misleading. The plaintiff in Mindes
did not assert equitable estoppel against the Air Force; he instead asserted that his dismissal had violated due process. Id.
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progeny regarding these issues are merely dicta because none of
those cases involved an equitable estoppel claim against the military.lllO Likewise, in Lavin, Helm and Jablon, the Ninth Circuit
cannot be said to have implicitly rejected the argument that
Mindes bars such claims because the military did not raise the
justiciability issue as a defense and the court did not discuss it
in any of those cases. 1II1 Further, the fact that no court has ever
decided the justiciability of common law equitable estoppel
claims against the military is not a ground for ruling that such
claims are not justiciable. Therefore, the majority in Watkins
cannot be criticized for finding that the Ninth Circuit's adoption
of the Mindes test did not require it to rule that Watkins' equitable estoppel against the Army was nonjusticiable.
The majority's test for analyzing the merits of common law
equitable estoppel claims against the military requires plaintiffs
to demonstrate that 1) they have exhausted all effective instraservice remedies; (2) the military, via authorized acts of its
agents, engaged in affirmative misconduct going beyond mere
negligence; 3) the injustice done to the plaintiff outweighs the
harm that will be done to the public interest if the military is
estopped; and 4) all the traditional elements of estoppel are present.11l2 This test does not abandon the concept of justiciability;
instead it "intertwine[s] the concept of justiciability with the
standards to be applied to the merits of the case. "1113 The first
three elements of the majority's test provide grounds upon
which a federal court can summarily reject an equitable estoppel
claim against the military and are very similar to elements of the
Mindes test. The third element is a flexible one that gives the
military more deference than other federal agencies lll4 by requir150. See supra notes 57 - 60 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 68 - 76 and accompanying text. Helm is the strongest case in
favor of the argument that the Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected the argument that its
adoption of Mindes bars it from addressing federal nonconstitutional claims against the
military because that case arose after the Ninth Circuit had formally adopted the
Mindes test and also because after rejecting the plaintiff's constitutional claim on justiciability grounds, the court, in dicta stated that, were the estoppel claim properly
before it, it would reject it on the merits. This argument, however, is not very persuasive
because the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the estoppel claim was merely dicta and it is clear
that the court had treated the estoppel issue very summarily.
152. See supra notes 83 - 101.
153. Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Mindes
analysis).
154. It is well established that federal courts are required to give the military agen-
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ing the court to consider the military's special need for protection from intrusion into its affairs. Thus, the test developed by
the majority in Watkins cannot be criticized for failing to give
appropriate comity, prudence and deference to the military.
The majority opinion probably will not be readily accepted
by other circuits. lllll The majority opinion invites debate about
whether its new test should be used to analyze all equitable estoppel claims against the military or only those claims that are
coupled with a constitutional claim. 11l6 More importantly, it
opens up speculation about the possible ramifications of the
court's holding. In analyzing the balance of hardships element,
the majority did not consider the possibility that there may be
dozens or even hundreds of other openly gay and lesbian members of the military who might also attempt to invoke equitable
estoppel against the military should they ever be denied reenlistment on the basis of their sexual orientation.
In a related omission, the majority does not discuss whether
the military can ever radically change a policy or regulation such
as the one at issue. The majority must have believed that the
facts in the Watkins case were extraordinary and unlikely to recur and, for that reason, unlikely to have much impact on the
military. The majority would probably reject a similar claim
from a servicemember who had not always been as candid about
his sexual orientation or who had not invested as much time in
military service, or who had not always received such outstanding performance evaluations or whom the military could prove
had actually committed illegal sexual conduct.
As a majority of justices pointed out, the court in Watkins
should have issued a ruling on Watkins' constitutional claim. 11l7
cies more deference than other federal agencies. See supra notes 40 - 65 and accompanying text.
155. The Seventh Circuit has already stated that "we find the Ninth Circuit's estoppel application doubtful." See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989)
(lesbian Army reserve sergeant who was barred from reenlistment claimed that Army
regulation making homosexual status a nonwaivable disqualification for service violated
her first and fifth amendment rights to free expression and equal protection).
156. The majority noted that by deciding the case on narrow equitable grounds it
could avoid a decision on broad constitutional grounds. See supra notes 85 - 89 and
accompanying text.
157. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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This claim necessitated a holding on the recurring constitutional
issue of the proper review of government classifications based on
sexual orientation. By avoiding this issue and deciding the case
on estoppel grounds, the majority in Watkins has necessitated
piecemeal litigation and further disruption of military affairs. IllS
Although Judge Norris's concurring opinion addresses this issue
and will likely be of great value to other circuits,11l9 a majority
opinion would have been much more beneficial to the Army and
gays and lesbians because it would have brought us much closer
to having the issue finally resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
John Glenn Karris*

158. At the time that the court in Watkins avoided determining the constitutional
issue of the proper level of scrutiny of government classifications based on sexual orientation, the issue was pending in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits. See High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 90 D.A.R. 1373 (9th Cir. 1990)
(class of gay applicants for security clearances claimed that policy of subjecting gays to
expanded investigations and mandatory adjudications violated their fifth amendment
equal protection rights); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
159. In Ben-Shalom, the Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning of Judge Norris's
concurring opinion and agreed with Judge Hall's dissent. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990.
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